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A little regulatory pluralism with your counter-hegemonic advocacy? Blending analytical frames to construct joined-up food policy in Canada

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Contents

Introduction

Canadian food policy is deficient in many ways. First, there is neither national joined-up food policy, nor much supporting food policy architecture at the provincial and municipal levels[1] (for details, see MacRae, 2011). Second, there is no roadmap for creating such policy changes. And third, we don't have an analytical approach to food policy change in Canada that would help us address deficiencies one and two.

This paper addresses the third theme. In our experience, a significant limitation of existing Canadian food policy work is the lack of frame blending to bring more explanatory power to both current phenomena and a more desirable process of change. Consequently, we attempt to unify disparate literatures pertinent to the food policy change process in Canada to create a more cohesive approach, using four case studies of analyses already conducted to demonstrate the frame blending process.

Calling it new theory may be too grand; perhaps it qualifies more as midrange theory (Geels, 2011 citing Merton, 1968) or tactical frameworks (Stackowiak, 2013). Merton (1968:39) defined midrange theory as "theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization and social change". Geels (2007) elaborates by characterizing mid range theory as: (a) about concrete phenomena (such as socio-technical transitions), (b) linking theory and empirical research, (c) specifying relationships between concepts into analytical models, d) using empirical research to identify patterns. These seem more characteristic of what we're proposing than grand theory.

By joined-up food policy, we mean the coherent and comprehensive policy environment[2] that links food system function and behaviour to the higher order goals of health promotion and environmental sustainability. A joined-up policy unites activities across all pertinent domains, scales, actors and jurisdictions. It employs a wide range of tools and governance structures to deliver these goals, including sub-policies, legislation, regulations, regulatory protocols and directives, programs, educational mechanisms, taxes or tax incentives, and changes to the loci of decision making.

There are change frameworks in use, but many are much narrower or broader than what helps us understand food policy change. Our focus is on policy transition which is a bit different from other broad sustainability, innovation and technology transition frameworks (see Markard et al. 2012). Smith (2007) cites Berkhout (2002:1-4): "A policy goal for sustainable production and consumption *systems* imply a different kind of innovative activity to that traditionally

[1] In certain ways, municipal food policy architecture is the most advanced, see MacRae and Donahue (2013).
[2] What Dombkins (2014) might refer to as the meta system that governs a set of subsystems

associated with a single product or new business practice". Other change frameworks attempt to explain causality for major social events. Geels (2011) addresses some of the strengths and weaknesses of other grand change theories in the context of defending his preferred approach, the Multi-level Perspective (MLP). But there are elements of change frameworks that have utility for food policy change and I attempt to weave them into my construction.

But our approach isn't about causality[3], but rather "what could be" or normative approaches, changing the system in a direction of our intention. Some other food policy transition literature touches on this, but is typically more rooted in causality than our approach (for observations on the state of the field, see Hinrichs, 2014). What kind of food policy contributes to wider food system change to create sustainability and health? How can it be implemented? What is the transition path for a co-ordinated well-planned non-reactive construction of a joined-up food policy? The normative approach is about using our understanding of "what is" to help us drive "what could be". Compared to causal theories that typically focus on socio-cultural and economic causal forces, the normative dimension means paying more attention to the role of the state and CSOs, because direction is required from such actors (Elzen et al., 2011).

The complexity of food policy change

Food policy change is complex for policy makers, because (MacRae, 2011):

- "it's about the intersections between a number of policy systems that are historically divided intellectually, constitutionally and departmentally
- governments have no obvious institutional place from which to work, and the instruments of multi-departmental policy making are in their infancy; there is no department of food
- supporting new approaches means extensively confronting many existing and entrenched policy frameworks and traditions
- it means having to address the externalized costs of conventional food, health, economic and social systems, and these externalized costs are only partially understood and quantified
- it means understanding food as more than a marketable commodity, which creates problems for certain departments

[3] Geels (2011:34): "Frameworks such as the MLP are not 'truth machines' that automatically produce the right answers once the analyst has entered the data. Instead they are 'heuristic devices' that guide the analyst's attention to relevant questions and problems. Their appropriate application requires both substantive knowledge of the empirical domain and theoretical sensitivity (and interpretive creativity) that help the analyst 'see' interesting patterns and mechanisms."

- it challenges many of the central tenets of current agricultural and economic development, and health care system that concentrates on cures rather than prevention."

Such complexity has significant implications for food policy, with most phenomena falling into what Dombkins (2014:35) calls emergent policy change for which,

> Emergent strategies are required to:
> - bring together multiple other component polices and systems (that may not be under the direct control of the policyowner[4]) to deliver a higher order policy outcome using a system-of-systems.
> - accommodate change in the component policies and systems—policies that display emergent characteristics need shell designs that can accommodate a plug-and-play approach, with component policies being replaced and new policies being added.
> - use stewardship, as opposed to direct control.

Such approaches, according to Dompkins are associated with policy that governs a system of systems, and food systems qualify for such categorization because of the vast numbers of products, transactions, locations, actors and governance elements. In such cases, the policy environment must set higher order goals that guide component actors, policies and systems of the larger system of systems.

Critical to both complexity and a normative approach is having a transition framework, and a food policy transition framework of choice is Hill and MacRae (1995)'s Efficiency – Substitution – Redesign. This framework serves as both a guide to action, and an indicator of progress. In this framework, Stage 1 strategies involve making minor changes to existing practices to help create an environment somewhat more conducive to the desired change. The changes would generally fit within current policy making activities, and would be the fastest to implement. Second stage strategies focus on the replacement of one practice, characteristic or process by another, or the development of a parallel practice or process in opposition to one identified as inadequate. Finally, third stage strategies are based fully on the principles of ecologies, particularly agroecology, organizational ecology, political ecology and social ecology, and are fully elaborated to address complexity (the earlier stages benefit from an understanding of complexity, but are not in themselves necessarily complex to execute). They take longer to

[4] As discussed below, given constitutional divisions, there are multiple food policy owners, suggesting the need for a collaborative approach. A critical question is from where is the central animation of the joined up food policy design and execution (on the challenges see Dombkins, 2014)? Differing from Dombkins, this work is about both the system of systems and the component systems as the components are currently deeply flawed.

implement and demand fundamental changes in the use of human and physical resources. This final, or redesign stage, is unlikely to be achieved, however, until the first two stages have been attempted. Ideally, strategies should be selected from the first two stages for their ability to inform analysts about redesign (the most underdeveloped stage at this point) and to contribute toward a smooth evolution to the redesign stage.

A presumption of this framework, then, is that policy change in the Canadian food system is largely evolutionary. It is more a long-term reformist approach, with dominant structures progressively adapting to policy pressures, ultimately leading to a profound redesign of the food system. The approach fits broadly under the rubric of long-term policy design within transition management (Voss et al., 2009). The redesign stage, thus, is visionary but presumes progressive layers of transition leading to its realization. Regarding the relationship of this framework to some of the grand theories of policy change (for an overview see Stackowiak, 2013), in recent times, there have rarely been grand leaps in food policy in response to major exogenous shocks, so Punctuated Equilibrium theory is not likely in play, though the ESR framework foresees such possibilities in the shift from the Substitution to Redesign stages, once the terrain has been prepared for such major changes. The Advocacy coalition framework is sometimes applicable when progressive politicians / parties are in power, but this is more likely to happen now at the municipal level in Canada (see MacRae and Donahue, 2013) and occasionally provincially. Power elite and Regime theory is usually not highly applicable because food system decision making is so diffused domestically (though international food regime theory is pertinent as discussed below). A related issue, also addressed below, is that the Canadian food movement is often insufficiently mature to play effectively the roles associated with these theories of change. Kingdon's agenda setting theory (Kingdon, 1995) is, however, pertinent at each stage of the ESR framework as will be presented later.

In our experience, each normative food policy study requires the blending of analytical frames to bring explanatory power to the phenomena under review (see case studies below for elaboration). We are building here on the blending frames approach of others. Elzen et al. (2011) use the Multi-level Perspective (MLP), social movement theory and Kingdon (1995) to examine shifts in animal welfare policy in the Netherlands. Stachowiak (2013), not specific to food policy change, identifies 5 global change theories with 5 others that focus more on strategy and tactics, suggesting that advocates must blend them together to achieve their purposes. Barndt (2008) assessed numerous frames and filters useful for uncovering the international supply chain story of the tomato. Many Masters students at York's Faculty of Environmental Studies have similarly attempted to blend frames to explore certain dimensions of Canadian food policy and programme change (as examples, see Bradley and MacRae, 2009; Louden and MacRae, 2010, Patel and MacRae, 2013; Campbell and MacRae, 2013; McCallum et al., 2014).

The context for food policy change in Canada

Canada, like most industrial countries, has never had a coherent and integrated national food policy (for more details on why, see MacRae, 2011). Since the colonial period, agricultural production has been the primary driver of food policy and agricultural policy in the 19th century dealt primarily with Canada's obligations to Britain (Skogstad, 1987). This commenced a long period in which agriculture was subservient to other interests, primarily immigration, national security, and economic development (Fowke, 1946:272; Britnell & Fowke, 1946) .
Much of the basic policy infrastructure for the food system was put in place in the late 19th and early 20th century, derived from powers of criminal law (e.g., the *Food and Drugs Act*, early versions of what became the *Pest Control Products Act*) or trade and commerce (e.g., *Canadian Agricultural Products Act* and *Meat Inspection Act*).[5] Hedley (2006) argues that this approach has its roots in the thinking of John Stuart Mill (1965:800):

> ... governments ought to confine themselves to affording protection against force and fraud: that these two things apart, people should be free agents, able to take care of themselves and that so long as a person practices no violence or deception to the injury of others in person or property, legislatures and governments are in no way called upon to concern themselves about him.

This thinking, modified later on the food production side by Keynesian economic influences, has remained central on the food consumption side (Hedley, 2006), meaning that governments are very reluctant to intervene in food consumption issues, a major impediment to creating a joined up food policy. Perhaps the only time this reluctance was overcome was during the 2nd World War, when food consumption was influenced to support the war effort with a large number of interventionist instruments (Britnell & Fowke, 1962; Moseby, 2014).

The first food safety regulations were part of an 1875 amendment to the *Inland Revenue Act*, prohibiting the adulteration of food, drink and drugs. At the time, reducing levels of adulteration and fraud was a significant focus of food system interventions (McKinley, 1980). The link to food commerce has always complicated efforts to protect and ensure public health (for recent case examples, see MacRae & Alden, 2002).

On the food production and distribution side, the historical and still dominant model is founded on positivist - reductionist traditions[6] in Western agricultural science and economics.

[5] This section is adapted from MacRae and Alden (2002).
[6] These scientific traditions "are based on several unprovable assumptions: (1) that the essential characteristics of any phenomenon are captured best by analyzing its parts: (2) that there is a sharp distinction between facts and values; (3) that only those facts that are measurable are indeed facts; and (4) that these measurable facts are more valid than other types of information or knowledge" (Dahlberg, 1993:294).

These fields have a long tradition of dividing scientific and economic problems into discrete, manageable pieces, essentially eliminating environmental context from the inquiry. The rise of industrial capitalism created a demand for tools for profit making, and scientists and industrialists collaborated to create them (Albury & Schwartz, 1982; Levins & Lewontin, 1985). Many scientists, thus, were confining their interests to subjects of value to industrial capital. With the successful development of sophisticated tools and technologies, it was easier to believe that nature could be endlessly managed and manipulated without negative consequences (Leiss, 1972). Commitment to positivist-reductionist approaches was reinforced by the apparent effectiveness of the tools and technologies within a narrow frame of interpretation. Powerful tools, however, invariably have multiple harmful side effects, although their significance is often not understood until significant damage has been done.

These philosophical roots remain central to most agricultural science, economics and policy today and many current problems are the secondary and tertiary negative effects of the productivist model. For example, most research devoted to reducing manure pollution is necessary because of earlier research and extension efforts that minimized the role of manure in creating soil fertility in favour of synthetic fertilizers. The view of manure as a waste to be managed is now viewed as an error.

The constitutional divisions, first imposed by the British North America Act of 1867, are major impediments to a unified approach. Generally, the federal government has a lead policy role on matters related to cross-border commerce, farm financial safety nets, agricultural research and technology development, food and phytosanitary safety, food standards, packaging and labelling, and nutritional health (narrowly defined). The provinces (and sometimes territories) also have supporting roles in these areas, and take the lead on matters related to commerce and food safety within their boundary, land use and agricultural land protection, property taxation, many areas of environmental protection, public health and agricultural extension. The two jurisdictions often negotiate on program design, with the federal government offering guidelines or rules to establish national coherence and equivalency, but the provinces often taking a lead role in program delivery. The traditional funding formula in agriculture is 60% federal / 40% provincial and territorial. Municipal involvement depends largely on the location of the municipality, and its province. Urban municipalities generally have little direct role in food production and supply but because many have responsibilities for public health delivery (under the authority of the province), do engage in food inspection activities and nutritional health promotion. Urban municipalities also affect food distribution through zoning policies that may determine food store and food company locations and their associated economic activity. Some actively promote urban agriculture. Rural municipalities can have more direct impacts on agriculture through zoning, and property and education tax decisions. Municipalities often have a lead responsibility for household and commercial waste management, typically under rules promulgated by provinces. Since a large part of the waste stream is food and food packaging,

their policies and programs (or lack thereof) may indirectly impact food system behaviour. Given such complex divisions of authority, the system can only work well with high levels of collaboration across jurisdictions, a situation often lacking as the different levels compete for authority or attempt to avoid responsibility for problematic files.

Similar jurisdictional complications exist in related policy areas with significant food system implications, such as transportation, social policy and health care. Stated Koc et al. (2008:126): "Over the years, the federal government has expanded its jurisdiction over income tax, unemployment insurance, social welfare programs, and a national health care plan. Yet, the administration of many food-related levers, such as education, labor, health care, agriculture, and social legislation, have remained under provincial jurisdiction. Municipal governments were left to fund and govern their own public health (including food inspection and health education), water supply, urban and regional planning, housing, recreation, transportation, and social services—all of which were directly or indirectly relevant to food system sustainability." As it relates to food security, they stated (Koc et al., 2008:131): "One underlying reason for federal inactivity on issues such as those identified in the Action Plan for Food Security is the broad and uncoordinated distribution of agriculture and food-related responsibilities among various branches of government. At the federal level, issues dealing with food production and processing are under the jurisdiction of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Industry Canada. Environment Canada often has a lead on sustainability files. When trade and foreign aid are involved, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Export Development Canada, and the Canadian International Development Agency are added to the mix. A similar complexity appears for nutrition-related matters, involving Health Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Yet hunger, poverty, local development, and equity concerns are handled by Human Resources and Social Development, Indian and Northern Affairs, Status of Women Canada, plus a variety of regional agencies. Since many of these portfolios are also the domain of provincial or municipal governments, the political system makes action on complex issues such as food security unmanageable. As well, it is very difficult for CSOs to stay abreast of developments at all these levels." Koc et al. (2008) referenced the somewhat paradoxical jurisdictional shifts that have occurred. On the one hand, there has been the dispersion of some federal function to global institutions (see below). On the other, decentralizing tendencies, often associated with perceived budgetary pressures, has shifted many federal responsibilities to provincial or municipal governments. In this bifurcated environment, the ability of national/federal governments to create joined up food policy is hampered.

Since at least the 1930s, Canadian legislation and inter-governmental agreements have normally been broad and enabling, with the details provided partly in the regulations, but especially in directives, protocols, programmes, and codes of practice promulgated under the statute or agreement. This approach is designed, in part, to facilitate adjustments without the

need for new parliamentary debate. Major amendments to legislation occur infrequently (e.g., the Pest Control Products Act has typically only been significantly updated every 25-30 years, see MacRae et al., 2012), and require many years of discussion and consultation. However, the regulatory details are changed more frequently. This allows legislatures and Cabinets to provide broad direction and oversight, and for civil servants to implement the details, consistent with the political direction. To be effective, the civil service must be skilled, properly resourced and accountable to the political process. This contrasts with other jurisdictions, for example the European Union, which has a more prescriptive approach whereby legislation sets out more specific performance requirements and is less reliant on instruments created by the civil service to give force to the legislation.

The flexibility of the Canadian approach can be compromised by its reliance on instruments and staffing strategies affected by budgetary pressures, competing authority between agencies, efforts to prevent political oversight of bureaucratic activity, bureaucratic difficulties sorting through conflicting policy directives (for example, facilitating commerce versus minimizing risk), the overall competence of the civil service, and the related reliance on third party actors for execution, particularly the private sector (for pertinent food safety examples, see MacRae & Alden, 2002). This legislative approach also makes it more difficult for legislatures to determine and ensure programmatic, regulatory and administrative compliance with legislation and policy directives. If non-government parliamentarians (carrying out their traditional oversight functions) have the capacity and skills to identify non-congruence between an Act and its regulatory instruments, there are no practical measures at hand to correct the discrepancies[7]. This explains, in part, why the Auditor General, Parliamentary Budget Officer and Access to Information processes have become so pertinent.

Of course, Canada is also a significant player in the international food arena and its policy architecture affects and is affected by global forces. The shift from primarily locally to globally distributed foods is a longstanding process, dating back some 500 years in the European world (Coleman, 2008). Canada, as a settler colony, was part of the first food regime, 1870-1930, and as industrial production took hold post-1930 with its associated surplus for trade and food aid, also was a significant player (albeit not a leader) in the second food regime[8] (McMichael, 2009). Specific sets of implicit and explicit rules guided these regimes and cemented Canada's trajectory in an agro-industrial model (the reductionist-positivist tradition) with significant resources devoted to penetrating global markets and significant political influence to large food corporations. During the second regime, many jurisdictions moved away from policies of domestic self-reliance in basic foods to greater international movement of

[7] In theory, judicial review would be an option if the regulation or policy is truly at odds with the legislation. The larger problem is that Canadian legislation rarely imposes statutory duties that are judicially enforceable, reflected in the common legislative language of "mays" instead of "shalls".
[8] There may also be a third food regime emerging, see McMichael (2009).

goods, and the dispersion of some nation state functions to supra-national formations such as the IMF, the World Bank, or multilateral or bilateral trade agreements (Koc et al., 2008). Agriculture was originally part of the trade rules established under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) but there were so many loopholes that it was effectively exempt until the 1994 GATT Uruguay round agreement resulted in its full inclusion (what became the Agreement on Agriculture when the World Trade Organization [WTO] was founded in 1995).

The role of the trade deals in food globalization is open to some debate (Bonnanno & Constance, 2008), but at a minimum they have helped cement the shift away from the local and regional supply chains that provided basic foodstuffs up until the 1960s (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989; Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002). Canada's participation in the World Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture (WTO AoA) represented a shift from a national state-assistance approach to agricultural development - the idea that agriculture had some exceptional characteristics requiring unique state interventions - to partial adoption of a neo-liberal paradigm (Skogstad, 2008). However, Skogstad (2008) cautions against viewing this as a paradigm change, arguing that it represents a shift, but not a rejection, of the state assistance model. And she argues that such shifts have not exclusively been a product of the trade arrangements, influenced as well by changes in policy communities, state budgets and other domestic factors.

The trade agreements have reduced instrument choice, though not consistently and coherently (Guthman, 2008; Hatanaka et al., 2012). In Canada, many pre-AoA programmes directly associated with increased production intensity have been altered in part because of trade agreements (Skogstad, 2008). These include income stabilization schemes that were deemed production distorting, such as the Western Grain Stabilization Program and provincial meat stabilization programmes, regional production supports and development schemes, and subsidies to specific production sectors that were deemed underdeveloped or prime export opportunities (Wiebe & Wipf, 2011). Associated with these programme changes have been overall reductions in support to producers (as defined by the Producer Support Equivalent) since the mid-80s (AAFC, 2013). These instruments were part of the state assistance paradigm that somewhat protected agriculture from market forces and indirectly supported local food systems. Some of these instruments, if they still existed, would now be restricted by the WTO AoA. Instead, the favoured tools for the federal and provincial governments are tripartite-funded business risk management programmes, sectoral contribution agreements and information programmes to drive market development. The contribution agreements are not typically framed around very specific programme parameters, but rather serve multiple purposes and are therefore more acceptable to AoA signatories. As measured by two indices, Canadian policies are only very modestly trade-distorting compared to most other industrialized countries (Anderson & Croser, 2010), again reflecting the reconstruction of state interventions to comply with trade agreements.

The other significant international arena with relevance for food policy making in Canada is the UN system and the right to food. Rideout et al. (2007) stated: "The right to food was first

recognised as a fundamental human right in 1948. Since then, Canada and many other OECD nations have signed several national and international agreements promoting the right to food ..... However, food security has not been achieved in Canada despite strong economic growth in the past decade and a comprehensive Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with which food security could be embedded into a domestic human rights framework." Despite these international commitments, they concluded that little progress has been made on incorporating food rights into Canadian charters, legislation, programming and practice. In many ways, they argued, the situation has deteriorated as Canada's social safety net has slowly unravelled, and the gap between the design of Canada's income support programmes and its international commitments has widened. Following a mission to Canada in 2012, the UN Special Rapporteur on Right to Food (2012) concurred, lamenting the many deficiencies in Canada's right to food implementation, particularly for aboriginal peoples and other vulnerable groups. The federal response was entirely dismissive, claiming there were no serious food insecurity issues in Canada. However, central to food rights thinking is the notion of progressive realization, with the state a key enabler, but not the sole determinant, of that realization.

A moment may have arrived to advance food policy change. McMichael (2009) and Friedmann (2009) speak to the transitions between food regimes, believing that the industrial world is experiencing one right now, a period in which the dominant processes and institutions are vulnerable. In Canada, all the main federal parties have produced statements or reports on a national food strategy/policy, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (2011) developed a vision statement on the future of food. The People's Food Policy Project (2011) of Food Secure Canada conducted a community-based process to develop a comprehensive national food policy. The Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute (2011) and the Conference Board of Canada released numerous food reports, ultimately resulting in a food strategy (Bloom, 2014). Though partial initiatives, lacking in breadth or depth or both, they present the possibility of significant food policy change in ways that have not been seen for at least 30 years (MacRae, 2011).

The place of the food movement

As mentioned above, a normative approach requires drivers of change and, in the Canadian food system, these normative drivers take different forms:

- Farm and commodity groups and agri-food firms, the traditional policy community (Skogstad, 2012), advocate for specific or broad changes to a wide range of processes that affect their membership. These are typically about removing specific obstacles or

constructing new types of supports. Interventions can also be defensive, fending off changes that government or social movement groups propose.

- Social movements apply pressures that the state feels compelled to respond to, usually articulated around specific food system practices or products (e.g., factory farming, genetically engineered organisms, specific pesticides to be banned). Most food movement actors are oriented to this approach. Elzen et al. (2011) call this normative contestation from outsiders.
- Strange bed-fellow alliances are constructed that typically involve social movement actors and the traditional agricultural/food processing policy community. Such alliances are increasingly part of the Canadian food system landscape because so many organizations across the advocacy spectrum are dismayed with the course of food policy (for a case study on pesticides, see MacRae et al., 2012).
- Civil service actors no longer necessarily follow directives from political bodies. The demise of the traditional relationship between elected and unelected officials (see Savoie, 2003) means that the civil service can overtly or covertly push for change, somewhat independent of political directives. Canada's first Agricultural Policy Framework in 2002 was largely a civil service construction, as is the basic architecture of genetically engineered food regulation (see Abergel & Barrett, 2002).
- State mediated advisory processes created to manage policy change, in part a response to Treasury Board directives in the early 2000s to open up participation beyond traditional policy networks
- Researchers and health professionals trigger reviews of existing regulation, typically regarding suitable levels of exposure to, or consumption of, substances.

Sandwell (2012) believes that although the term "food movement" has increasing currency, it remains contentious. Some social movement literature suggests that the "food movement" is more a series of related or networked movements working semi-independently. Alliances have formed across thematic areas as: 1) collectively negotiated frameworks of analysis and action; 2) diverse and growing networks; or 3) shared repertoires of action. Sandwell (2012) states: "The Food Movement has gradually emerged out of a variety of different critiques that are now seen as related and interpenetrating. Though total consensus has definitely not been achieved and may never emerge, the last decade has seen an increasing number of actors and groups espousing frameworks that view many different problems as importantly interrelated."

Koc et al. (2008) provide a history of the Canadian food movement's activities within several of the above modes, focusing on normative contestation and participation in state mediated advisory processes. Through both successes and failures, it is clear from this history

that the much of the food movement still operates on punctuated equilibrium, coalition framework and power elite approaches (see Stackowiak, 2013). Following Kingdon's (1995) typology, the tendency is to focus on the formal policy windows, rather than the unpredictable and less formal ones. Extrapolating from Day (2005), other food movement actors practice activities beyond the traditional conception of counter-hegemony. A broader understanding of social resistance is required, one that includes the construction of alternative approaches that lie outside the dominant system and work with the state on evolutionary change (also known as regulatory pluralism). Unfortunately, practicing regulatory pluralism remains an ongoing challenge (Koc et al., 2008; MacRae & Abergel, 2012). Thus, a wide range of activities are undertaken, but food organizations display varying degrees of skill and resourcing, depending on the approach taken to policy change.

The food movement in Canada is not as evolved as the environmental movement. In reviewing 40 years of ENGO advocacy, Winfield (2012) cautions that:

- Institutionalization of an agenda doesn't necessarily mean a paradigm shift has taken place (in other words, critical reflections on what appear to be successes are always required);
- Sophisticated strategic analysis and execution is required to ensure the most effective interventions for the long term at the least cost to civil society;
- Creative and entrepreneurial approaches are especially required when the dominant paradigm is deeply embedded in institutions. Hill (1994:372-3) elaborates on two pertinent elements of this embeddedness: that the standard of proof for many bureaucratic organizations is the criminal law standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, and that often deeply embedded commitments to ministerial regulation are the norm. Consequently, the prospects of a state directed policy community or regulatory pluralism are limited;
- Constructing alliances representing broad sectors of support for policy change has been very important.

Frames for understanding the food system

Given the complexity of the food system, a variety of analytical frames have been used to understand its operations, impacts (both positive and negative) and social relations. The following have been helpful for this analysis:

Table 1: Useful food system frames of analysis

Frame	Useful for understanding.....	Key citations
Marxian analysis: the metabolic rift and class dynamics in agriculture	The failure of the capitalist model of agriculture	Foster (1999), Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), Albritton (2009), Berstein (2010)
Oppositional politics and Transnational Peasant Movements	Transnational peasant movements and counter-hegemonic CSO activity	Gramscii (1992), Desmarais (2007)
Conventional economic analysis	How mainstream agriculture thinks about the food system and firm decisions	Brinkman (1987)
Criticism of conventional trade theory	How trade agreements do not actually deliver the benefits promised	Rosset (2006)
Agroecology	How to design production and distribution systems around ecological principles	Altieri (1990), Gliessman (1990)
Foodshed analysis	How to advance food system localization by examining supply chain dynamics and capacities within a region	Kloppenburg et al. (1996)
Supply chain analysis	Food moves spatially and from actor to actor	Bloom and Hinrichs (2011)
Alternative food networks	The initiatives that lie largely outside the dominant system	Renting et al. (2003)
Culture and communications	Our personal and collective understandings of food are influenced by cultural forces	Counihan and Van Esterik (2013)
Planning	The urban planning systems intersects with the food system	APA (2007)
Aboriginal ways of knowing	Aboriginal peoples understand the relationship between food, land and life	Turner et al. (2000)
Feminist theory	A critical ecofeminist approach images a completely different type of food system	Sachs (1992)
Anti-racism/food justice	The dominant food system favours particular ethno-racial and economically priviledged groups	Allen (2008)
Right to food	Food is a human right and has been recognized as such in many international covenants and agreements and its realization can be progressively enabled by states	Rideout et al. (2007)

In most food policy research, the use of multiple frames shines additional light on the relationship between food system function and the kinds of changes required to move the system in a more desirable direction. The policy interventions, then, must be coherent with the concepts and practices that appear to support the appropriate change process. This will be elaborated in the cases below.

General policy change frameworks to draw on:

Many policy change frameworks are of possible value when searching for both positive and normative explanatory power[9]. Most of these frameworks are not entirely unique, sharing dimensions with others, a characteristic that can be helpful when blending frames. The scope, scale and theoretical aspects of these frames is also variable, some having larger structural dimensions, other focused more on instrumental conditions, some highly normative, others more causal in orientation. Some, then, qualify as grand theory, others more mid-range (see discussion above). A brief description of potentially pertinent ones is provided in this section and then their application is developed in the cases that follow. Note that because we are focussed on policy change frameworks that contribute to our understanding of sustainable food policy change, we do not include all frameworks in this section.

1. The Pace of Change: Incrementalism vs. Punctuated Equilibrium/policy windows

The public policy literature generally assumes that significant changes in policy direction are difficult to achieve. Governance structures may be deeply embedded regarding the actors inside and outside of the state to include in policy-making processes and the underlying assumptions or policy paradigms on which they act (Skogstad, 2008). Dominant institutional and societal actors who feel that their interests are well served by the existing arrangements are likely to resist the entry of new actors or new ideas into the policy process. As a result, it is generally accepted that most policy change will be incremental in nature. Major changes in direction are not the norm, rather policy is likely to be modified slowly over time in response to evident weaknesses, problems and opportunities. Sitek (2010) cites Streeck and Thelen (2005) on the five mechanisms of incremental institutional change: "layering, which involves partial renegotiations of some elements of a given set of institutions by attaching new elements to existing ones; conversion, where institutions are redirected to new purposes; displacement, where the salience of a subordinate element of an institution rises; drift, where institutional change results from neglect of maintenance; and, finally, exhaustion, which involves the gradual withering away of a given institution over time." A derivation of this approach is directed incrementalism (Grunwald, 2000), somewhat more consistent with the ESR transition framework.

The notion of power elites (Domhoff, 1990; Mills, 2000) suggests that incremental administrative change can be advanced by working directly with authority to make decisions or the power to influence other decision makers. Power elites are not always officials - they may be non-state actors - but to be successful, you have to have one or more key allies in a position of

[9] Note that there is much theoretical debate about the merits of some of these frames, arguments we do not address here.

formal or informal power. Stone (1989)'s concept of regime theory suggests that policy change happens through the influence of a small body of powerful individuals on decision makers. These powerful individuals typically live beyond electoral processes, so are less visible to the public. To influence policy directions, actors have to access this small body or somehow create alternate comparably powerful groups.

Other theorists have focussed on the circumstances under which major changes in policy direction can take place, with previously dominant policy and governing paradigms displaced. Such changes are generally relatively rare events, requiring specific alignments of societal, institutional and circumstantial forces for them to occur. Epitomized by Kingdon's (1984) concept of 'policy windows', where "the separate streams come together at certain critical times, solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces. This coupling is most likely when policy windows (opportunities for pushing pet proposals or conceptions of problems) are open. (. . .) Windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling problems or by happenings in the political stream. (. . .) Significant movement is much more likely if problems, policy proposals, and politics are all coupled into a package". Kingdon (1984: 210) suggests that (policy) windows may be missed if proposals and solutions "have not already gone through the long gestation process before the window opens". Although Kingdon argued that the streams are quite separate, others believe that policy entrepreneurs work across all the streams to generate change (Elzen et al., 2011).

The implication of this approach is that public policy change may work more along the lines of punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary theory, characterized by long periods of relative stability, but potential for significant policy shifts in relatively short periods of time when with new actors get involved, or when an issue receives greater media scrutiny and public attention (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).

2. *Drivers/Causes of Change (Interplays of Ideas; Institutions; Interests; Physical, Technological, Environmental and Economic factors)*

The mainstream political science and public policy literature initially placed a very strong focus on institutional structures - formal power structures and rules, such as federalism, and the features of different systems of government (e.g. cabinet parliamentary vs. separation of powers) – to understand the public policy process. More societally-oriented, pluralist approaches began to emerge in the 1950s, highlighting the importance of forces and factors outside of the state as key drivers of policy change. These approaches open possibilities of analysis through such lenses of gender, race, and class in terms of understanding the reasons for specific policy outcomes. Recent mainstream approaches to policy change have tended to emphasize the interplay between the two streams of institutional structures and actors and societal factors.

Policy networks and communities approaches, for example, operate on the premise that policy-making unfolds through decentralized and more or less regularized and coordinated interactions between state and societal actors. Approaches that focus on formal and macro-level decision-making bodies like parliament, cabinet, and first-ministers conferences may therefore ignore the realities of the policy process and obscure the imperatives for effective and legitimate governance (Skogstad, 2008a).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) concept of coalition frameworks theorizes that policy change happens through coordinated activity among a range of actors with the same core beliefs and purposes, dependent upon a sympathetic government/administration and skilled advocates with a strongly shared goal. In their view it is often the case that an existing administration has to be removed to create change opportunities or there are significant external events that change public opinion and socio-economic conditions.

Known as the new institutionalism and departing from some incrementalist dimensions, "Historical institutionalists started to emphasize that institutional paths contain ambiguities, multiple layers, and competing logics, which can be used by policy actors as vehicles for experimentation, conversion, recombination, and transformation." (Sitek, 2010). Neo-institutionalism highlights the potential for relations between specific state and societal actors to become so deeply embedded that they become 'institutionalized' and difficult to disrupt or displace.

Drawing on economic approaches to understanding behaviour, Public choice/rational choice approaches emphasize the role of self-interest on the part of institutions, non-state actors and individuals in explaining their actions (Sproul-Jones, 1996). Although offering explanatory and potentially predictive potential in some cases, public choice approaches have been criticized for underplaying the complexity and range of variables potentially involved in public policy decision-making and assuming that self-interested rationality will explain behaviour in all cases.

Some recent work has re-emphasized the importance of formal Institutional arrangements. Donald Savoie's (1999) Governing from the Centre thesis is that it is unlikely complex, multi-dimensional, and multi-departmental policy issues (such as food) will undergo substantive parliamentary discussion, given the roadblocks at all levels[10]. Such policy is unlikely to be a priority of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). Cabinet participation in policy making has been eroded, so that agriculture or health ministers are not likely to bring forward significant food and agriculture legislation without PMO approval. Committee capacity to review is compromised by the complexity of most bills and by the limited resources of the committee and individual parliamentarians. MP-bureaucracy relations are generally strained because many elected officials believe public servants now have too much influence over policy development.

[10] Note that more limited and highly politically charged issues, such as the Canadian Wheat Board, are still occasionally part of parliamentary debate.

More specifically, some parliamentarians are dismissed by their limited capacity to provide oversight on legislative implementation, especially pertinent in an era of implementation and enforcement-related cutbacks. Some parts of the civil service are now viewed as political liabilities because of their failure to respond to politicized issues in ways that remove pressure from elected officials. In turn, public servants question the competence of many elected officials, viewing them as adversaries, given civil service loyalty to the government of the day (Savoie, 2003). Such realities have significant implications for policy change, which we elaborate on in the pesticides case study below and in MacRae et al. (2012).

Recent judicial decisions in Canada regarding the meaning of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, particularly the meaning of aboriginal 'title' (*Tsilhoqot'in Nation vs. British Columbia*, 2014) and the establishment of the Crown's 'duty to consult' with aboriginal people where their rights or interests may be affected (*Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)*, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511), have also placed a renewed focus on the importance of institutional arrangements. In particular, they emphasized how changes to the formal rules of governance can fundamentally alter the power positions of institutional and societal actors. The Supreme Court's *Spraytech vs. Hudson* (2001*)* decision has had a similar impact regarding the scope of legislative action potentially available to municipal governments in Canada.

Ideas as variables/Discourse Analysis

The dominant approaches to the study of public policy in Canada have tended to emphasize the roles of government agencies and structures, and non-state actors and forces in understanding public policy debates and the resulting policy decisions (Doern, 1996; Howlett et al., 2010). While the roles of underlying ideas, norms and assumptions in policy formulation are generally acknowledged in the study of public policy (Atkinson, 1993:1-3; Macdonald, 2007), the manner by which they shape and bound policy discourses has generally received much less attention. In comparison, the policy literature addressing the themes of state and non-state interests and actors and their interactions through policy networks and communities and institutions is more robust (Finlayson, 2004). Ideas, norms and assumptions have tended to be dealt with through the proxies of the state and non-state actors whose actions they inform, rather than being treated as variables in their own right.

Discourse analysis places a renewed emphasis on understanding the assumptions, judgements and contentions that are the basis for analysis, agreements and disagreements among the actors involved in policy debates (Dryzek, 2013:9-10; Winfield and Dolter, 2014).

The importance of economic/physical/environmental/technological variables and factors

Similarly, the mainstream public policy and policy change literature tends to underplay (or completely ignore) the importance of the physical dimensions of public policy problems, and the economic context within which policy decisions are made. Some of the literature dealing with environmental, natural resources and energy policy cases does place more emphasis on these factors (Hessing et al., 2005: Chapter 2). For Doern and Toner (1985), the fundamental geographic realities of the distribution of Canada's fossil fuel resources between eastern and western Canada are an essential factor in understanding the evolution and fate of the federal government's 1980 National Energy Program. Courchene and Telmer (1998) and Winfield (2012a) highlight the centrality of structural changes to Ontario's economy in understanding the types of issues that have come to the forefront in province's economic, energy and environmental policies. The increasing physical manifestations of the consequences of climate change may compel policy responses, at least in terms of adaptation, and may weaken the position of opponents of action the reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The emergence of 'fracking' technology over the past decade in North America and its impact on the energy sector highlights the potential for technological developments to fundamentally alter power relations among different actors and require new policy agendas to respond to their consequences.

Efforts to draw streams together

Both earlier (Doern and Toner 1985) and more recent work (Winfield, 2012a) have sought to re-integrate the four major categories of variables involved in public policy change: interests; institutional frameworks; ideas/norms/discourses; and physical and economic context. Behind these approaches is an implicit recognition that no single variable or even combination of variables is likely to be determinative in all cases. Rather, the explanations for major policy changes are typically more contingent on the particular combination of circumstances.

Within this context, institutional frameworks and physical and economic context provide 'landscape' conditions within which public policy decisions emerge. These variables are relatively fixed. However, if they are altered in some way, they can be 'game changers' that compel major shifts in policy. As noted earlier, recent judicial decisions regarding the meaning of aboriginal and treaty rights provisions of the Canadian constitution, or the scope of municipal legislative authority, provide examples of such events. The restructuring of economies in eastern Canada away from manufacturing and resource processing and towards service and knowledge based activities provides another. Societal forces and ideational norms are likely to be more fluid, and therefore more likely factors in driving policy change.

3. Perspectives from Complexity Thinking: Path Dependence and Transitions

Path dependence (or lock-in) – originally developed from the economic history literature, Wilsford (1994: 252) argues that "A path dependent sequence of political changes is one that is tied to previous decisions and existing institutions. In path dependency, structural forces dominate, therefore policy movement is most likely to be incremental. Strong conjunctural forces will likely be required to move policy further away from the existing path onto a new trajectory. It is the combination of path-dependent limits along with occasional windows of exceptional opportunity, or conjunctures, that determine the ways small or big that a political system responds to policy imperatives."

Multi-level Perspective on socio-technical regime change (Geels, 2011: 25) – to some degree building on regime theory and path dependence, Geels believes that "sustainability transitions are necessarily about interactions between technology, policy/power/politics, economics/business/markets, and culture/discourse/public opinion. Researchers therefore need theoretical approaches that address, firstly, the multi-dimensional nature of sustainability transitions, and, secondly, the dynamics of structural change. With regard to structural change the problem is that many existing (unsustainable) systems are stabilized through various lock-in mechanisms, such as scale economies, sunk investments in machines, infrastructures and competencies. Also institutional commitments, shared beliefs and discourses, power relations, and political lobbying by incumbents stabilize existing systems .... Additionally, consumer lifestyles and preferences may have become adjusted to existing technical systems. These lock-in mechanisms create path dependence and make it difficult to dislodge existing systems. So, the core analytical puzzle is to understand how environmental innovations emerge and how these can replace, transform or reconfigure existing systems." A multilevel perspective links three scales of analysis. 'Socio-technical niches' form the network involving new innovations at a local scale. The 'socio-technological regime' is made up of the social network of infrastructures, regulations, markets, and established technical knowledge. The 'socio-technical landscape' is the exogenous environment of air quality, resource prices, lifestyles, and political, cultural and economic structures. The regimes are nested within and structured by landscapes, and niches are nested within and structured by regimes.

Transition management (Voss et al., 2009:284) – Part of a reflexive governance approach, " .... policy design in transition management comprises five main components: (1) Establishing a transition arena, (2) developing a vision, (3) pathway development through back-casting techniques, (4) experimenting with pathway options and (5) monitoring, evaluation and revisions..... For each of these components of the transition management process, a variety of societal actors are supposed to participate and provide knowledge, competences, material resources and viewpoints."

Summarizing, the socio-technological transitions and public policy literatures touch on many common themes regarding processes and barriers to major shifts in policy direction, but have largely emerged in parallel to one another, with connections between the two only beginning to be explored recently (Hoffman, 2013; Meadowcroft, 2009; Voß & Bornemann, 2011) .

4. Comparative studies

Comparative studies are worth brief mention. They cut across the categories presented here because they contrast how policy changes (and explanatory frameworks) are applied in different environments. They have been used to understand agricultural policy differences in Canadian provinces (cf. Montpetit and Coleman, 1999), international health policy change conjunctures (Wilsford, 1994) or the possibilities of paradigmatic agricultural policy change across international borders (cf. Skogstad, 2012). They help us understand what might be more effectively executed in Canada. The comparative method has been set out by numerous authors, including Collier (1993).

5. Regimes/Governance Models

In this category fall frameworks that place more emphasis on governance than the change process per se, but they have significant implications for the kinds of strategies proposed to drive change. They can be combined with the policy change frames discussed in the earlier subsections to bring more explanation to observed phenomena or proposed solutions. We include a quick review of them here and show their utility in the case study section.

Regulatory pluralism – a governance regime that embraces a wide range of coordinated and integrated instruments (including some traditional command and control regulations), well matched to the desired effect and implemented by an equally wide range of state and non-state actors (see, for example, Gunningham, 2005).

Instrument choice (Eliadis et al., 2005) – This is a tools approach because in the current context, tools are typically the focus of advocacy work. Governments cannot undertake grand new deals on the food system for a variety of reasons. Advocacy groups are framing their advocacy based on their favourite instruments. This is more of a public management approach that recognizes that the political layer often does not deal with the details. In advocacy terms, instruments are not without political values so one uses them to drive philosophical change. Fed-prov-territorial debates are usually about instruments and their design. For many issues, the political framework has already been set, so instrument design becomes the only negotiating

space. Instrument choice fits within the efficiency/substitution stages of Hill and MacRae's (1995) ESR transition framework.

Loci of decision making – Hill (1994) uses the term choice of organizational arrangement (mode) for regulation and examines the interest politics-mode paradigm – decision style framework to explore the tensions that can be inherent in a mode choice. Modes are carefully crafted mixes of structure, resources (staffing and budgets) and organizational processes. In her view, the choice of mode for regulation is "a fluid, evolutionary, policy community-wide activity in crafting machinery for delivering regulatory policies and programmes out of various possible structures, budgets and staffing levels and administrative processes." (p.362). In other words, mode choices are often made by a single decision maker.

Cases:

Four cases elaborate on the process of blending historical realities, transition concepts, and food system and policy change frameworks. As stated earlier, this is not a search for the best frameworks, but rather the cases hopefully elucidate a reflexive approach to identifying the blends of frames that will offer the most explanatory power to the issues being explored. The cases were selected from work we've been involved in with collaborators, across different jurisdictions (international, national, provincial, municipal) and thematic areas (trade, pesticide regulation, health care, and joined up food policy). They involve different analytical frameworks, scopes and scales, and a range of actor realities. Some are interpretations of what has happened, others of what could be.

The general policy change literature suggests a set of guiding questions for food policy analysts. We focus on themes typically not well examined by social movement actors (see MacRae and Abergel, 2012), in particular, understanding the governing policy paradigms, the jurisdictions and structures of governance and loci of decision making, and the range of potentially applicable instruments. The questions are as follows:

Governing and Policy Paradigms/Regime and Landscape conditions

- How firmly embedded is the status quo? What is the role of the state in supporting the status quo or is it more deeply cultural and economic with minimal current state intervention? What is the role of ideas/discourses? To what extent are the environmental and technological contexts important to understanding the change process? Geels (2011) refers to this as regime rules: "regime rules are cognitive routines and shared beliefs, capabilities and competences, lifestyles and user practices, favourable institutional

arrangements and regulations, and legally binding contracts. Because existing regimes are characterized by lock-in, innovation occurs incrementally, with small adjustments accumulating into stable trajectories. These trajectories occur not only in technology, but also in cultural, political, scientific, market and industrial dimensions. While science, technology, politics, markets, user preferences and cultural meanings have their own dynamics, coordinated by different sub-regimes, they also interpenetrate and co-evolve with each other" Tactically, this affects how advocates might push for new policies/tools vs. modifications to existing ones and the extent to which the strategies engage the state vs. wider socio-cultural and economic phenomena.

Institutional Context/Loci of Decision-making

- What level of government has lead jurisdiction? Are other levels of government competing for leadership on the file? Or is the issue one that everyone wants to avoid?
- Where within the decision making structures are decisions being made? Particularly, is the issue a Parliamentary discussion? Or are decisions largely being made at a sub-parliamentary level (see Savoie, 1999, 2003)
- What unit of analysis is appropriate? Multiple departments across one level? Multiple departments across multiple levels, a sub-unit within one department?

Roles of Non-State Actors

- Where do the issues fit traditionally on the private sector – NGO – public sector spectrum of activity?
- How skillful and resourced are CSOs on the issue?

Potential for Niche to Regime/Landscape Transitions

- Are there niches or on-the-ground exemplars that show how practice can guide better policy, and how policy improvements can lead to more on-the-ground activity (for examples at the municipal level, see MacRae and Donahue, 2013)? What instruments are suitable?

In the cases below, these questions serve to provide a core structure for analysts and advocates. While not representing a policy advocacy strategy per se, the answers provide the basis for establishing such strategies in the future. After reviewing the responses to these core questions, we ask whether there are apparent gaps in the analysis that require the consideration of additional

factors or questions, beyond those identified in the core framework. This enables us to both complete the analysis, and consider whether there are recurring factors or variables that need to be added to the core analytical frame. In our conclusion, we elaborate on how the frame identification and blending process has worked and its challenges. Ultimately, our hope is that the cases help enhance analytical skills and produce a better roadmap for food policy change.

1. *International agreements: Trade and its effects across multiple government levels on local/sustainable food production* (MacRae, 2014)

There are numerous ways to examine trade deals, including policy analysis (Hajer, 2003), through the lens of economic and political globalization (Coleman et al., 2004), neo-colonialism (Rosset, 2007), food regime theory (Pritchard, 2009; Otero and Pechlaner, 2010), analyzing economic risks and benefits across different food chain actors (Kerr and Gaisford, 2007), and trade deals as "roll back" neoliberalism, or the use of neoliberal concepts and actions to rollback certain dimensions of social progress (Peck and Tickell, 2002). However, these frames are only partly helpful for understanding the effects of trade deals on policy to support local/sustainable food production and distribution, as there is significant debate about their effects. So MacRae (2014) sought a different way to bring explanatory power to this question.

How firmly embedded is the status quo? What is the role of the state in supporting the status quo or is it more deeply cultural and economic with minimal current state intervention? What is the role of ideas/discourses? To what extent are the environmental and technological contexts important to understanding the change process?

The ideology of free trade is deeply embedded, which explains its endurance in the face of significant evidence it is deeply flawed (see for example Daly and Cobb, 1989). Dating to the economic philosophy of David Ricardo and his 1817 treatise, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, his theory of comparative advantage still sits at the heart of free trade ideology, despite the reality that in the modern world, the conditions that allow trade to generate societal benefits no longer apply. The assumption that free trade brings widespread benefits is now a rarely challenged sacred cow within much of the agricultural economics and policy community. It is a significant obstacle to new thinking about the global food system.

Despite these assumptions, the mechanisms of free trade delivery are highly contradictory and often ambiguous. These mechanisms polarize discussions across nations and between food system subsectors. As discussed above, the geography and economic performance of Canadian agriculture across regions and commodities has a significant impact on policy positions, and ultimately reveals potential spaces for contestation. There is no singular position within the

agricultural sector, a situation that creates the possibility of unusual alliances against trade agreements. The Canadian state, however, is an active facilitator of trade agreements, a key part of why Canada has moved from a state assistance paradigm in agriculture to a somewhat hybrid approach where the state is still prepared to treat certain subsectors as "special" while others remain more subject in theory to the forces of free trade. As measured by two indices, Canadian policies are only very modestly trade-distorting compared to most other industrialized countries (Anderson and Croser, 2010), in part, reflecting the reconstruction of state interventions to comply with trade agreements (Skogstad, 2008).

What level of government has lead jurisdiction? Are other levels of government competing for leadership on the file? Or is the issue one that everyone wants to avoid?

The federal government has jurisdiction since trade agreements are about cross-border trade, part of the federal constitutional authority related to trade and commerce. However, informal and sometimes formal approval by the provinces is required. The internal political realities of Canada require that the federal government account for politically sensitive production and distribution issues, although the diversity of regions and agriculture means that the federal government trades different interests off against each other or offers compensation against losses incurred by the deals. In the case of the Canada – EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), formal provincial approval is required because this agreement will take provisions more deeply into provincial jurisdiction than previous agreements. Although provinces have indicated preliminary agreement, the adoption process will likely take several years and could be fractious (Clark et al., 2013). Municipalities are also potentially affected by certain trade deal provisions, but as instruments of the provinces, do not have independent jurisdiction. Many have objected to CETA inclusion but it is not clear their provinces will take account of those objections.

Where within the decision making structures are decisions being made? Particularly, is the issue a Parliamentary discussion? Or are decisions largely being made at a sub-parliamentary level?

Although trade deals are typically ratified by legislatures, the trade agreements are usually part of high profile political agendas implemented by the national governing party. The Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office are very involved. The negotiating team is usually led by high ranking officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada.

What unit of analysis is appropriate? Multiple departments across one level? Multiple departments across multiple levels, a sub-unit within one department?

The lead department is Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. Staff from many other departments participates in negotiating teams. Consultations happen with many provincial departments, farm and commodity organizations, agri-food firms and organizations. This is a multi-unit activity, most of it highly confidential, which narrows the policy network.

Where do the issues fit traditionally on the private sector – NGO – public sector spectrum of activity?

Many private firms are major promoters of trade arrangements to facilitate freer movement of goods and are active participants in negotiations. The public sector is ultimately responsible for the elements of the deals. NGOs are typically opposed and have only very limited access to the process.

How skillful and resourced are CSOs on the issue?

Canadian food NGOs have developed some skills and analysis regarding the wider forces that create the trade arrangements, and the potential negative implications of many of the features of the deals. NGO positions are typically counter-hegemonic. They have had limited influence on deal construction and shape, in part because of the lack of transparency and in part because they have paid only limited attention to many ambiguities in the texts and the associated implications for instrument choices.

Are there niches or on-the-ground exemplars that show how practice can guide better policy, and how policy improvements can lead to more on-the-ground activity?

Not really. This is a very divisive issue, with apparently limited middle ground. Opponents typically focus on rejecting trade deals and proponents do not support interventions that in their view favour domestic production and might trigger trade disputes that will penalize exporters. A typical response from elected officials when questioned about the failure to support local / sustainable food systems is that the trade arrangements do not permit such interventions. Such reactions are evidence of the power of the dominant norms and assumptions in the policy system.

Additional explanatory features of the frameworks

A local/sustainable food system lens is obviously central to the inquiry. For this, MacRae employed agroecological theory as central to understanding the design and execution of sustainable production and distribution (cf. Altieri, 1990; Gliessman, 1990). Although the foodshed concept (Kloppenberg et al., 1996) is also highly pertinent, especially to issues of locality, given its early state of development, existing political boundaries, and the current nature

of regional food supply chains, a more jurisdictionally oriented approach to locality is required (see Louden and MacRae, 2010).

The current opposition of local/sustainable food advocates to trade regimes in Canada focuses on the need to withdraw from them, or to substantially alter their construction, and these are clearly long term agendas (see for example, the Toronto Food Policy Council, 1994), falling within the redesign stage of Hill and MacRae's (1995) Efficiency-Substitution-Redesign transition framework. While this is an important line of reasoning, perhaps a more pressing set of questions includes: In the short to medium term, can local/sustainable food systems be supported within the current trade environment? Can efficiency-stage initiatives be proposed that still comply with trade arrangements?

The ESR framework is a generic change framework that can be applied to many transition contexts and cuts across numerous policy change frameworks, so it is worth highlighting some of the linkages. The Efficiency stage is essentially tinkering with the status quo, a very incrementalist approach. Of the 5 elements of incrementalism highlighted by Streck and Thelen (2005), conversion would bleed into stage 2, Substitution. The socio-technical regime approach highlights niches, which are a subset of the Efficiency stage. When a niche is embedded in a dominant institution (or a regime), it passes to the Substitution stage. Smith (2007) cites Hoogsma et al., that niches on their own are unlikely to transform regimes, but when the regime itself substitutes practices or processes based on its own significant learnings of niches, or when significant regime instability exists due to internal or external pressures, then institutional change is more possible[11]. At a tactical level, Kingdon (1995)'s agenda setting approach is useful for identifying efficiency and substitution stage strategies with substitution strategies normally designed as well to exploit the contradictions in institutions consistent with a New Institutionalism frame. The ESR framework typically involves a gradual shift to redesign, although it can also incorporate phenomena associated with punctuated equilibrium, but this is relatively rare in the Canadian food system.

Certainly, in this analysis, elements of Incrementalism and New Institutionalism are pertinent. Many of the proposals outlined in MacRae (2014) are designed to exploit contradictions in the trade deal language and process. The trade deals certainly represent an

[11] Alot of MacRae's work is about how to structure the linkages from niches to regime to use Smith's words. This is what the food movement is not so good at. Smith talks about the third way of translation, that niche and regime can come together to collaborate, how they might understand each other's context to come closer together. This is what some dimensions of food system change require. According to Smith (2007), there are "three different kinds of translation:

1. Translating sustainability problems, i.e. how problems in the regime inform the guiding principles creating the niche.
2. Translations that adapt lessons, i.e. reinterpreting elements of socio-technical practice in the niche and inserting them into regime settings, or modifying the niche in the light of lessons learnt about the regime.
3. Translations that alter contexts, i.e., changes that bring the regime closer to the situation that pertains in the niche, or vice versa."

entrenched Regime identified in the Geels (2007, 2011) STR approach, in part because of the norms and assumptions surrounding the societal benefits that are believed (as opposed to proven) to flow from free trade. The traditional policy community remains dominant, but significant disputes between state assistance and free trade communities typically frame the Canadian negotiating positions. Because the loss of instrument choices is commonly identified as the reason why the state cannot support the evolution of local/sustainable systems, the instrument choice frame is highly pertinent.

Using a textual analysis, MacRae (2014) concludes that there are numerous ways to promote local/sustainable food system development without running afoul of trade agreements. Bundling local and sustainable production together may create new opportunities for exemptions and re-categorization of initiatives to non-discriminatory trade status. Depending on the deal, sub-national governments, para-governmental agencies and NGOs are often exempt, and many food and agricultural sectors will support such exemptions because they are disfavoured by the agreements. Ultimately, innovative ideas to promote local/sustainable food that do not fall under existing categories or clauses may not attract attention because they are not sufficiently significant to trigger a trade dispute.

2. *Federal legislative change is the primary focus: Agricultural pesticides*[12] (MacRae et al., 2012)

Agricultural pesticide use remains a strategic target for social movements as the evidence of harm to ecosystems and human health is now well established. Although there has been progress reducing use of many of the most problematic pesticides, the pace of change has been much slower than many advocates, and indeed many farmers, would have hoped. MacRae et al. (2012) examined the tensions across the traditional policy network and with ENGOs from the late 80s, including the pesticide registration review of 1988-92 that led to the transfer of regulatory authority from Agriculture and Agri-food Canada to Health Canada, the passing of a new Pest Control Products Act (adopted in 2002, brought into force in 2006), and the development of a new programme to encourage pesticide reduction, the Pesticide Risk Reduction and Minor Use Programme (PRRMUP). This research was inspired by the confusing events leading up to, and immediately post-adoption of, the new pesticide legislation, and the ENGOs efforts to understand why their advocacy was not entirely successful.

How firmly embedded was the status quo? What was the role of the state in supporting the status quo or is it more deeply cultural and economic with minimal current state intervention? What is

[12] Note that there is a different, albeit significant story to be told about the cosmetic use ban in urban / suburban areas as highlighted above in the Supreme Court decision of *Spraytech vs. Hudson*.

the role of ideas/discourses? To what extent are the environmental and technological contexts important to understanding the change process?

Reliance on pesticides is both deeply cultural and deeply regulatory. The industrial food production paradigm and practice is heavily wedded to synthetic chemical inputs, including pesticides. The discussion above of the dominant paradigm of agriculture science is deeply applicable, and pesticides have been a central tool of the long standing cultural notion that we are at war with nature. The policy system has clearly adopted such paradigms. The dominant assumption, therefore, is that pesticides are useful if their inherent toxicity (as killing agents) is properly applied and managed. Equally important, the policy system has doubts about alternative approaches, partly reflected in the absence of an effective national strategy to reduce pesticide use[13]. One reason for the absence of an effective strategy is that many pest problems result from poor farm design (issues of rotation, location, canopy, timing, borders, etc), and there has been a reluctance on the part of government regulators and extension staff to propose significant changes to farm design, that being considered the purview of the individual property owner. Pesticide costs are low relative to reliance[14] and many externalized costs are unpaid by pesticide users (Tegtmeier and Duffy, 2004). This has discouraged farmer willingness to invest in new approaches and created an accentuated aura of importance for pesticides as the primary pest control method. Issues of economy and geography are also important because pesticide use varies tremendously across regions and crops, with regulatory decisions having differential impacts. Some sectors, consequently, have been more interested in alternative approaches and this has helped create strange alliances, for example the apple and canola industries participating in advocacy work with World Wildlife Fund Canada (see MacRae et al., 2012).

What level of government has lead jurisdiction? Are other levels of government competing for leadership on the file? Or is the issue one that everyone wants to avoid?

The federal government has authority for registration, classification and labeling, and the provinces for regulating use (Hill, 1994). Municipalities in some provinces now have some authority over use regulation as well. The registration authority is expressed through the Pest Control Products Act (PCPA). It first appeared in 1927, as the Agricultural Pests Control Act. The legislation allowed the Minister of Agriculture to deny registration on the grounds of adulteration, lack of efficacy, copy-cat qualities, and threats to public health. This latter provision was very general, although there were some more specific controls over pesticide

[13] MacRae was involved as a consultant in efforts to set up the Pest Management Centre and PRRMUP, providing extensive advice to the federal government on how to improve the programs. Only some of that advice was heeded.
[14] 6% of farm operating expenses in 2011 Statistics Canada (2011)

residues in the Food and Drugs Act of 1920. The Agricultural Pests Control Act was amended in 1939, with some expanded provisions related to its main purposes - to ensure farmer access to non-fraudulent products - and a new name, the Pest Control Products Act. From 1939 to 1969, there were only incremental adjustments to the Act. Experimental evidence to justify a product's use was first introduced in 1949 and modified in 1954, but regulators did not challenge the validity of manufacturers' claims. The 1969 version of the legislation was considered a very significant modernization because it was the first to substantially recognize pesticides' potential for harm (Hill, 1994). The Act was not significantly revised between 1969 and 2002, despite substantial new knowledge about pesticides and their chemistry.

The legislative framework has never been designed to encourage pesticide reduction, focusing instead largely on the conditions to be met for the registration – or pre-market clearance - of pesticides (Castrilli and Vigod, 1987). This situation exists because food safety legislation in Canada has been built on an anti-adulteration platform (Ostry, 2006; Blay-Palmer, 2008) that is not designed to encouraging changes in production practices that would focus on pest prevention and thereby reduce reliance on pesticides. Some analysts trace the problem to the absence of provisions in the Canadian constitution (the British North America Act of 1867) that expressly authorize the regulation of poisons (Hill, 1994). Some provinces have developed significant pesticide reduction strategies as part of their authority for agricultural land use and practices, but most of these have experienced only limited success. Some commodity organizations have also participated in programming spearheaded by the new federal programmes, but farm adoption of new systems has been limited.

Where within the decision making structures were decisions being made? Particularly, was the issue a Parliamentary discussion? Or were decisions largely being made at a sub-parliamentary level?

The legislation was clearly a parliamentary discussion. Advocates for legislative change, however, were not very cognizant of the wider angle dynamics between parliament, the PMO and line departments. The sub-parliamentary dimensions of this case were not very obvious to ENGOs and they failed to appreciate how significantly they would affect the outcomes of the legislative and programme design process.

What unit of analysis is appropriate? Multiple departments across one level? Multiple departments across multiple levels, a sub-unit within one department?

In the 1980s, the Plant Products Division (PPD) of AAFC was responsible for administration of the Pest Control Products Act, but it did get assistance from other departments informally, principally Health Canada, Environment Canada (EC) and Fisheries and Oceans Canada. These

arrangements had started in the 1960s. The collaborations were formalized in the 1980s, as AAFC attempted to fend off calls for transfer of authority to Health or Environment Canada. They also created a Pesticides Directorate in the 80s to take over responsibilities from the Plant Products Division. Additionally, through this period a series of changes were initiated by the civil service, attempts to address (ultimately unsuccessfully) the critics' concerns. HC and EC were not satisfied either, in part feeling that their reputations as effective regulators were being challenged by the critics, and their advice not properly heeded by AAFC. AAFC could refuse Health Canada's recommendations on registrations and Environment Canada's big concern was the lack of attention given by the Minister of Agriculture to environmental issues.

In the 1990s, authority was largely transferred to a new unit within Health Canada, the Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA), but some of the same interdepartmental tensions remained and the stakeholders remained largely dissatisfied with the shift in locus. Reduced risk pesticide programming is shared between AAFC and the PMRA.

Where do the issues fit traditionally on the private sector – NGO – public sector spectrum of activity?

Intense political battles between the main policy actors - pesticide firms, farmers, NGOs and regulators - were the norm from the 80s. These battles reflected widely divergent views amongst stakeholders about the utility vs. costs of agrichemicals and the industrial food production model, who should regulate pesticides and what exactly should be regulated, and individual vs. collective rights. The private sector (manufacturers and farmers) felt strongly that other actors should have only limited say in these discussions because their economic livelihood was not at stake. The NGOs believed they were the only parties really concerned about common good issues. The regulators, ultimately, had final authority over what was permitted and how it was to be used.

How skillful and resourced are CSOs on the issue?

ENGOs have been significantly involved in this issue since the 1970s, with larger ones such as CELA, Pollution Probe and WWF contributing significant resources to the issue. Many smaller organizations have also participated, though frequently from a less skillful and financially weaker base. WWF-Canada and CELA were particularly active in the 1990s and 2000s keeping the need for new legislation front and centre. They went to the extent of engaging a law firm, on a pro-bono basis, to write a completely new and detailed bill, based particularly on ENGO interpretations of the most progressive pesticide acts and regulations in the USA and Europe. The resulting proposed bill was submitted to the Health Minister in 2000, and several meetings were held with the Minister's staff regarding its content and the prospects for introduction. Their

interventions did significantly hastened introduction of a bill, but not one with the desired content. They also participated in a strange bedfellows alliance, during the PCPA parliamentary committee hearings, with the Canola Council of Canada and the Canadian Manufacturers of Chemical Specialties Association that ultimately provoked development of a reduced risk pesticide programme. WWF in particular, was sophisticated enough in its interactions with the civil service to play a significant part in the development of new programmes. Ultimately, this NGO participation produced an environment more conducive with a regulatory pluralistic view of policy making and programme design.

Are there niches or on-the-ground exemplars that show how practice can guide better policy, and how policy improvements can lead to more on-the-ground activity?

Yes, both governmental and non-governmental initiatives had shown how pesticide reduction was feasible and achievable. But federal officials had argued for years that the 1969 legislation did not give them the authority to put in place a pesticide reduction programme.

Additional explanatory features of the frameworks

As with case #1, the agroecological paradigm helped identify the weaknesses of the chemical model of food production, and the parameters of a more ecological (reduced pesticide use) approach. The policy community / policy network frame was important for understanding the interactions among the many governmental and non-governmental actors attempting to influence new legislative and programmatic initiatives. Non-traditional participants in the policy network behaved consistent with a non-hegemonic approach to engagement, attempting to collaborate with those traditionally viewed as opponents to advance what turned out to be somewhat common agendas for change. The ENGO network did mature during the PCPA debates. The creation of unusual alliances reflected their collective ability to establish functional and cordial relationships that permitted different kinds of discussions to take place. The focus had shifted from criticisms of the pesticide system to a more sophisticated understanding of legislation, regulation and structures, skills that were weaker in the earlier advocacy phases. At some level, the CSOs were more knowledgeable about the details of the bill than were the civil service. That they were able to write detailed amendments, and identify extensive gaps in the knowledge of PMRA staff speaks to this. This also addresses the opportunities presented when one knows the file as well as the opposition. But, to be successful, this experience demonstrates that such knowledge has to extend to the sub-regulatory level. The work with the Pest Management Centre also reflected a more sophisticated ability to participate in bureaucratic processes. Relationships were built by providing information and analysis that the new division did not have, but recognized they needed. The outcomes demonstrated that ENGO work can be adopted, almost

unedited, if properly framed and presented, and no credit demanded, but that this requires different skill sets of advocates compared to parliamentary-level work.

Hill's (1994) loci of decision-making approach was critical to understanding the 1980s and 1990s tensions within departments and among external actors. The wider policy network was also involved in agenda setting, taking advantage of certain policy moments/windows (Kingdon, 1995) to press for changes. Savoie (1999)'s interpretation of governing from the centre was used to understand the dynamics witnessed between the governing party, the PMO, the PCO and senior staff of the PMRA during committee hearings on the bill. MacRae et al. (2012) ultimately reveal how fundamental a role the civil service played in establishing a new loci of decision making (the transfer from AAFC to HC), in parliamentary hearings for a new PCPA, and in program design. Their analysis shows how parliament is limited in its ability to fulfill its traditional role as overseer of government, as senior bureaucrats from the Pest Management Regulatory Agency, in concert with officials from the PCO, Justice Department and PMO, worked to restrict opposition influence over the shape of the bill. As well, sub-regulatory instruments shaped execution of legislation without any parliamentary oversight. In the post-bill programme design phase, the willingness of the civil service to engage with ENGOs was explicable within a regulatory pluralism frames adapted from Gunningham's (2005) work. In many ways, this interaction with the state was the most successful of NGO interventions, identifying the opportunities for new kinds of influence.

3. *Provincial policy and programme design: Integrating food into primary health care* (MacRae, in preparation)

Canada has not organized its health care system, in particular primary care, to reflect the evidence connecting diet and health. Many chronic diseases and conditions, including cardiovascular disease, hypertension and stress, cancer, diabetes, low birth weight infants (and associated problems), anaemia, and some infections in children are strongly related to nutrition. The absence of health care design features linking diet, health and primary care is compounded by Canada's deficient primary care performance relative to many other industrial nations (Glazier, 2012). The costs of primary care are high relative to the quality of delivery and health care outcomes, with other parts of the health care system stretched because of primary care deficiencies (e.g., Emergency Departments of hospitals). Efforts to integrate health promotion and disease prevention in primary care, rather than just curative treatment, have not historically been very successful (Nutting, 1986) and consequently, using food as a health promotion strategy is similarly compromised.

How firmly embedded was the status quo? What was the role of the state in supporting the status quo or is it more deeply cultural and economic with minimal current state intervention? What is

the role of ideas/discourses? To what extent are the environmental and technological contexts important to understanding the change process?

The dominant approach is deeply cultural and legislative. Health promotion is not valued by the dominant health system. The federal government never implemented phase II of the Douglas proposals to design a community-based health promotion system to complement publicly – funded health insurance. The supply of services, primarily those of doctors and hospitals, drive demand for health care. Consequently, when people are healthier, the perverse incentives of the system cause service providers to look for new patients. Physicians are the primary gatekeepers of patient care. The state negotiates with doctor associations to govern the system. A significant inequality exists between rural and urban services. Physicians do not behave as if food access has a significant impact on health.

Yet, primary care still represents an opportune place for food as health promotion. Providing a foothold for augmenting the role, primary care has traditionally focussed on some of the more limited dimensions of disease prevention and health promotion: immunization, screening, basic risk assessments, one on one health behaviour education and counselling. In contrast, the hospital sector is more designed for acute care, and long term and palliative care are not, by definition, about prevention. Although there are debates about the effectiveness of current primary care interventions, MacRae (in preparation) explores going beyond such limited approaches as they relate to food.

Such work is timely because a primary care reform agenda is being implemented in many provinces. The traditional physician fee for service model is less popular and new approaches that blend capitation, fee for service and salary are being explored. Increasingly, physicians are organized in teams and groups, with new types of incentives, and patients enrolled specifically with that team. Some groups involve a range of health care professionals, many of whom have stronger training in health promotion than doctors. Within an efficiency and substitution transition approach, are there significant opportunities to advance food as health promotion within primary care?

What level of government has lead jurisdiction? Are other levels of government competing for leadership on the file? Or is the issue one that everyone wants to avoid? (Jackman, 2000)

The Canada Health Act is the overarching federal legislation[15]. But health has been seen for some time as a federal provincial/territorial partnership, with some aspects delivered by the municipalities, particularly public health.

[15] Note that this Act is not really about ensuring the optimal health of Canadian's despite some of the language of the Act. Its primary purpose is to govern the conditions of money transfers to the provinces.

"…. at the time of Confederation, however, health care was not considered a matter of national importance but was seen primarily as an issue of private or local interest. In the event of illness, most people were dependent on their families and neighbours for care within the home. What little institutionalized health care did exist in 1867 was organized and delivered largely by local charities and religious groups rather than by the state….. As a consequence, the Constitution Act,1867 does not include "health" as a specific head of federal or provincial legislative responsibility." (Jackman, 2000)

Municipalities, thus, where there was any state intervention, were seen to be the responsible jurisdiction until the 20th century. Such authorities have been morphed, in the current period, into responsibility for community health delivery and local health planning. Federal jurisdiction in health then flows from its spending and criminal law power. The Canada Health Act essentially forces provinces to participate in cost-shared arrangements to fund health care. It works with the Federal Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, and the Canadian Health Transfer (CHT), to force provinces to meet certain conditions in order to receive money. It is defended legally as the setting of national standards, a constitutional authority of the federal government.

The criminal law power of the federal government is used, for example, to regulate safety of products under the Food and Drugs Act, as part of ensuring the physical health and safety of the public. There are, however, legal debates about the degree to which criminal law powers can be invoked when intervening in health, which raises questions about a truly substantial federal intervention in health promotion beyond traditional health and safety issues. Sounding a more interventionist note, regulatory, rather than just prohibitive, initiatives have been supported recently by the courts as legitimate under traditional spending authority. The courts appear to have extended the federal role in environmental health as well. There have also recently been decisions that support the view that the federal government has the right to intervene when situations are clearly national in scope, beyond individual provinces, under the peace, order and good government provisions of the Constitution.

From the constitution, the provinces have exclusive authority over establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals. With jurisdiction over property and civil rights as well, which supports provincial regulation of relations between individuals, the provinces have primary responsibility for health care delivery. Most provinces have public health acts granting authority to a medical officer of health and the power to regulate health professions and practices. Health insurance is also provincial jurisdiction.

The federal government, thus, has indirect ability to shape health care compared to the provinces, but a sense of partnership was somewhat formalized in the first Health Accord of 2004.The Accord identified the need for public health and health promotion coordinated and planned interventions[16], though there hasn't been much success on executing this part of the

[16] http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/fptcollab/2004-fmm-rpm/index-eng.php

agreement. But the current federal government unilaterally decided not to renew the Accord and set the financial transfer schedule without consulting the provinces, and is essentially saying health care is provincial jurisdiction and the federal government will provide some money, with transfers progressively restricted. In this 2014 Accord, only the principles of the Canada Health Act apply. The current federal government is effectively abandoning a quality oversight role.

What unit of analysis is appropriate? Multiple departments across one level? Multiple departments across multiple levels, a sub-unit within one department?

The jurisdictional and financial quagmires of health care create multiple sites for decision making. In areas of health promotion, the provincial role is paramount, with municipalities substantially involved in delivery, but this area is poorly funded relative to acute care and receives limited attention from medical associations, hospitals and provincial ministries of health. Food as a health promotion strategy receives even scanter resources and is a significant discussion in only a limited number of sites, most typically municipal public health units. This reality reflects the dominant norms and assumptions that health care and health care professionals create health, as opposed to social determinants.

Where do the issues fit traditionally on the private sector – NGO – public sector spectrum of activity?

Much of health care policy is negotiated, given constitutional traditions, between the government, the hospital sector and the provincial medical associations (e.g, the OMA), a limited negotiated governance model. The pharmaceutical industry is the most influential private sector actor, although since doctors in private practice are essentially small businesses, they too can be viewed as significant private sector players. NGOs are active in some subsectors, not so much in others. Food NGOs have had very modest influence, and where it has occurred has often been associated with some programme successes.

How skillful and resourced are CSOs on the issue?

Policy influence is generally limited except in some municipalities and few food NGOs focus particularly on the health sector. There is no NGO network actively attempting to integrate food into primary health care.

Are there niches or on-the-ground exemplars that show how practice can guide better policy, and how policy improvements can lead to more on-the-ground activity?

Food has long been a key component of health promotion work, but is often centred in public health units, community health centres, and health-focused NGOs. As such, part of the relationship between food and primary care is determined by the larger issue of health promotion and primary care. This is a significant area for scaling up and out.

Additional explanatory features of the frameworks

A social determinants of health frame helps understand the place of food in promoting individual and community health. In a social determinants approach, primary care is only a piece of the health story. Issues of income inequality and other systemic environmental challenges, including the structure of the food system, are bigger issues to be addressed. Consequently, larger strategies to promote optimal population health are ultimately much more significant than primary care, which focuses on individuals and families typically without much attention to the larger environment in which they are situated. The challenge is to better connect primary care to many of these wider interventions.

Given resource and institutional constraints, a key element will be demonstrating who can benefit from a "food as health promotion" strategy. Population epidemiological approaches can uncover this[17], and be combined with health economics to understand how, if diseases and conditions are prevented or delayed, food interventions might contribute to reduced morbidity and mortality and health care savings. Such studies of food intervention costs vs. benefits have been conducted for some time and have shown positive relationships (see TFPC, 1996), but scaling up and out such interventions to create system wide benefits has proven elusive.

Admittedly, the jurisdictional, negotiated governance and financial realities of this domain mean that change is difficult, sometimes characterized as a wicked problem. Path dependence / lock in (Wilsford, 1994) helps to characterize the challenges of moving the health care apparatus in a new direction. "In a path-dependent model, actors are hemmed in by existing institutions and structures that channel them along established policy paths." (Wilsford, 1994:251). Canada has a supply-driven health care system, where certain professional actors hold enormous influence and have few incentives to shift behaviour, practices and structures. Although Wilsford (1994) has identified conjectural movements in some countries where significant health care change has occurred, it is not obvious that such possibilities exist for food in the Canadian health care system. Consequently, proposed interventions will have to work within the constraints imposed by path dependence.

An instrument choice framework provides new explanation when, as in this case, there are many desirable targets, but delivering on them is proving difficult. There is substantial

[17] Typically, given the complex role of food and other factors in diseases and conditions, a multivariate conceptual framework is required, see Victora et al. (1997).

agreement on the need to transform our health care system, but much less on which tools will be most successful. One current instrument approach that fits within existing institutional and negotiating positions is new incentives for hospitals and doctors to align with government policy goals. This approach fits within the efficiency and substitution phase of the Hill and MacRae (1995) transition framework because these new incentives are not too challenging to the status quo, yet begin to advance change incrementally.

Food programme alternatives exist outside the dominant model, consistent with the niches of Geels' (2007, 2011) STR framework. In the Geels framing, the challenge is to integrate these niches within the existing regime and this is what MacRae (in preparation) addresses by examining new and existing structures of primary care delivery and their compatibility with a food as health promotion approach.

4. *Municipal joined up policy – charters, action plans, food policy councils* (MacRae and Donahue, 2013)

Over 60 Canadian municipalities have created food policy organizations, with almost a third having food charters, action plans or strategies, completed or in development, that reflect a joined up food policy approach. These comprehensive plans galvanize diverse actors, set a vision for their actions, and help leverage resources for implementation. They are often endorsed by city council, committees of council, or municipal departments. MacRae and Donahue (2013) surveyed the successes and failures of these municipal efforts and identified important themes that emerge from comparative analysis related to joined up food policy development and execution.

How firmly embedded was the status quo? What was the role of the state in supporting the status quo or is it more deeply cultural and economic with minimal current state intervention? What is the role of ideas/discourses? To what extent are the environmental and technological contexts important to understanding the change process?

As discussed at the beginning of the paper, the embedded assumption of the state is to intervene in the management of food supply and to leave food demand largely to the market place. Food system analysis is largely absent from all levels of government as a result. This constraint is compounded by the perception that food is not part of the municipal agenda, a dominant view particularly in the urban planning profession that has only recently started to shift. The financial pressures on Canadian municipalities, imposed by fiscal reallocations at senior levels, have discouraged potentially interested decision makers from taking on new mandates.

What level of government has lead jurisdiction? Are other levels of government competing for leadership on the file? Or is the issue one that everyone wants to avoid?

Municipalities have limited jurisdictional authority over the food system, yet they are faced with the consequences of the loss of agricultural land, the local effects of pollution and climate change, farmers' financial struggles, residents' uneven access to food, food affordability, public health problems associated with inadequate or poor quality diets, shrinking local food infrastructure, and reduced employment and tax revenues from food-related businesses. Municipalities intervene to address these consequences, sometimes intentionally, sometimes not, often employing food systems thinking. In part, they respond because of the failures of senior level policy and programming. Essentially, if Canada had a coordinated national joined-up food policy, the need for municipal intervention could be different or refocused. But in its absence (and other senior government policy failures), "...[l]ocal (and regional) spaces are now increasingly being viewed as key institutional arenas for a wide range of policy experiments and political strategies. These include new entrepreneurial approaches to local economic development as well as diverse programs of institutional restructuring" (Brenner & Theodore, 2002:1).

Where within the decision making structures have decisions been made? Particularly, has the issue been a Parliamentary discussion? Or were decisions largely made at a sub-parliamentary level?

Because a food system approach is new at a municipal level, it is uncommon for City Council to drive the agenda. Rather, it appears that NGO-departmental collaborations are the impetus, often with a Council champion to ensure a plan is approved.

What unit of analysis is appropriate? Multiple departments across one level? Multiple departments across multiple levels, a sub-unit within one department?

A different set of departments are typically more involved at a municipal level than one finds at senior levels – public health, parks and recreation, planning, economic development, social services – in part because food has not traditionally been viewed as a municipal domain beyond licensing, inspections and traditional public health nutrition. This typically means that no one department has an assigned lead role on food policy which paradoxically allows those most interested to carve out their own space, if they can get City Council support for their initiatives.

Where do the issues fit traditionally on the private sector – NGO – public sector spectrum of activity?

The municipal intersection with food systems preferences certain food firms: retailers, some wholesalers and wholesale markets, certain kinds of manufacturing, restaurants and food service. The farming and input sectors are only marginally involved within many municipal jurisdictions. Provincial departments of agriculture do not see municipal food system issues as part of their mandate unless they impinge upon their traditional responsibilities. The drive for change has come largely from NGOs working with sympathetic departmental (especially public health) and elected officials. The structure and practice of municipal government appears to create opportunity for food NGO engagement that is more substantial than at senior levels.

How skillful and resourced are CSOs on the issue?

Skill levels and resources vary tremendously from one municipality to another. Those municipalities with the most advanced local food policy work also typically have sophisticated CSOs participating.

Are there niches or on-the-ground exemplars that show how practice can guide better policy, and how policy improvements can lead to more on-the-ground activity?

It is the many emerging local projects and practices that typically drive interest in joined-up policy making. Community organizations have constructed many creative and effective alternative food projects, though their scale sometimes limits the number of citizens who can benefit relative to the need. However, these successes demonstrate value to municipal decision makers and create the conditions for a successful policy intervention. A key strategy for both internal and external advocates is to use programme and project successes to drive policy adoption, and then use the existence of a policy to obtain support for more initiatives to give substance to the policy.

Additional explanatory features of the frameworks

The Advocacy Coalition framework was useful at the municipal level because many successes have depended on local champions (for stories, see MacRae and Donahue, 2013). Their real value may be the tactical advice and skills they offer, rather than necessarily direct influence. Champions can navigate institutional structures and arrangements and know how to work across the full political spectrum. They are also skilled at advising external advocates on tactics to influence internal actors.

Concepts of regulatory pluralism are also very germane as the municipal level engages a wide variety of actors in programme and policy conception and delivery. Elected municipal officials often recognize the value of non-governmental actors more readily than occurs at senior

levels of government. Food Policy Councils are an explicit acknowledgement that municipal governments on their own lack the expertise to engage in effective interventions.

Because of both proximity to the citizenry and transparency, the institutional contradictions of municipal government can be more apparent, which the new institutionalism frame helps analysts understand. A key role for FPCs, given that they are frequently embedded in the structures of municipality government, is to exploit these contradictions to advance food policy change.

As with most food policy change, Kingdon's (1995) frame is very useful. This was especially exemplified in BC, where a policy window was created by the Olympics, and the desire to create a healthy population. Numerous changes were made to public health programming and funding arrangements that BC municipalities were able to take advantage of to advance local food policy development. It was also feasible to attach food to other existing policy agendas, including climate change mitigation, because of municipal and provincial commitments to improvements.

The diversity of modes for instrument choice across the 60 municipalities was analyzed using lessons from Hill (1994).The wide variety of attachments and instruments employed required categorization in order to see patterns in the data. MacRae and Donahue (2013) ultimately concluded that certain kinds of attachments and instruments were associated with greater likelihoods of success.

Voss et al's (2009) transition management approach also has some pertinence in this case, the only one where it is applicable. Municipal food policy development has not faced the same level of contestation as other levels of governance. Food policy councils act as a form of transition arena. The charters represent a vision for change and the action plans that flow from them can be viewed as products of a conceptual backcasting. Municipalities frequently support pilot initiatives to test the proposed changes and then formally evaluate their merits, subsequently modifying the approach or scaling up implementation.

Conclusion

Ultimately, we are searching for explanatory power in a complex field with many seemingly intransigent problems. There are many potentially valuable frames across multiple disciplines that can add value to our understanding of the changes required and the change process itself. Although many of these frames are overlapping and interconnected, they also have unique and distinct aspects. The challenge is to find ways to blend them together to enhance, rather than confuse, our learning. And they must ultimately help us find transition paths, without being deformed, through a policy environment characterized, as Voss et al. (2009:287) highlight, by

"…positivist policy-making, new public management or market-liberalism. Those paradigms are deeply ingrained in policy discourse, institutions and practices including tools like forecasting models, cost-benefit analysis, budgeting and controlling procedures or project evaluation manuals. "According to Voss et al. (2009), most deformation of transition design occurs during implementation, when the interaction with perverse policy institutions, cultures and contexts can completely distort a sophisticated plan. The discussion of norms and assumptions in the dominant policy system is highly pertinent here. But without a plan, there is no coherent direction and transition is about direction. A robust transition plan must ultimately frame and structure what actors involved in policy change do (Voss et al. 2009).

Some confounding difficulties of the blending process include:

- The implicit and explicit conditions in which each framework was elaborated do not necessarily line up with Canadian food policy realities. Teasing out what is comparable, and how much, is typically inexact.
- The frameworks have different degrees of causal vs. normative features. Although normative inquiry builds off causal factors, it is not a causal process per se. How applicable causal frameworks can be for normative inquiry is also a challenging exploration.
- Different frameworks espouse different degrees of political contestation vs. approval. Some really only work when the policy making apparatus is largely supportive. Others presume that the policy system only moves when under significant political pressure.
- Normative processes are not testable in the traditional sense, so it's not entirely clear what will work. This obviously has an impact on policy design, execution and evaluation, especially in a change-resistant organizational culture.
- The Canadian food movement is relatively young (and may not really be a movement) which means it is not always able to play the roles commonly played by social movements in change processes; related to this, different frameworks take different account of political power.
- Our understanding of complex phenomena is also relatively immature and most policy actors, both governmental and non-governmental, do not have sufficient grounding in this field to robustly understand what they are observing and experiencing.
- Transition thinking is also in its infancy, with only a limited number of researchers and participants using it to guide their solutions.
- Given current complexities and the new knowledge that has emerged since Canada's Confederation, the legal foundations of many interventions are not enabling of the change

process. Relying, for example, on the federal criminal law power to design "food as health promotion" tools has significant limitations.

- Among policy actors, many relationships remain competitive and antagonistic, with limited capacity for collaboration. This happens within and across different policy communities. Although not all change processes depend on a more pluralistic approach, many appear to require it, but the actors are not that skilled or experienced at working together. Entrenched ideologies, structures and jurisdictions contribute to this problem.
- Some frames raise significant questions about the nature of democratic processes. Although reflexive governance is championed by some as a more democratic way forward (Voss et al., 2009), advocates for change may not be capable of creating widespread consensus on complex policy issues (see MacRae & Abergel, 2012). This raises the possibility that small groups may ultimately be more successful at detailed policy construction, but without democratic participation at the construction stage. But can participatory processes at the execution stage compensate for this apparent democratic deficit?

Blending frames is challenging because it resembles a grounded theory approach. One sees certain phenomena and tries to make sense of them, looking at other work to potentially find explanation. To know if such approaches truly add value is also difficult and relies on triangulation from different sources and an understanding of different forms of research validity, including face validity, convergent or discriminant validity, catalytic validity, and whether the work is usefu1 and illuminating (Reason and Rowan, 1981)[18]. If successful, the reward is a clear-eyed view of current problems and how they might be solved, hopefully setting the stage for an action agenda that leads to a joined-up food policy for Canada.

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[18] Face validity (whether it looks right to the discriminating observer); convergent or discriminant validity (defined by Reason and Rowan [1981:240] as .. "when a number of measures which purport to measure the same thing all point in the same direction"); contextual validity (how any piece of data fits in with the whole picture); catalytic validity (allowing individuals or groups to take action based on the study resu1ts); whether the work is usefu1 and illuminating (providing some clarity on a topic that was not previously apparent).

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